

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 039449
ORIGIN L-03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OES-07 DOE-11 SOE-02 NRC-07 ACDA-12
SIG-02 MMO-04 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00
DODE-00 EB-08 H-02 INR-10 INT-05 NSAE-00 NSC-05
OMB-01 PM-05 USIA-15 SP-02 SS-15 STR-07 TRSE-00
PA-02 IO-14 CEQ-01 /147 R

DRAFTED BY: L/N: RJBETTAUER: AVW
APPROVED BY: OES/NET: LVNOSENZO
DOE-BENGELSDORF BRUSH
NRC-STOIBER
ACDA-MARSHALL
MM

-----022999 151259Z /50/65
P 142353Z FEB 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALDIP

UNCLAS STATE 039449

BRUSSELS FOR USEEC VIENNA FOR IAEA

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 8 (4) FIRST LINE OF (A) (B) (C)
OMITTED)

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION LEGISLATION

REFS: (A) STATE A-2202 (5/17/77), (B) STATE 35229
(2/10/78)

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF U. S. NONPROLIFER-
ATION LEGISLATION PROMISED REFTEL (B). AFTER SIGNING OF
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 039449

LEGISLATION, WE WILL CABLE TEXT OF SIGNING STATEMENT AND
AIRGRAM TEXT OF NEW LAW. WE WILL ALSO PREPARE MESSAGES IN
FUTURE DETAILING DEPARTMENT'S PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
MEASURES REQUIRED BY NEW LAW.

2. BACKGROUND: FOR SEVERAL YEARS, CONGRESS HAS BEEN WORK-
ING ON COMPREHENSIVE NONPROLIFERATION LEGISLATION. AT THE
END OF THE 94TH SESSION OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATION HAD BEEN
CLOSE TO ENACTMENT. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 95TH SESSION,
WORK BEGAN AGAIN IN BOTH HOUSES. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES AND ON APRIL 27, 1977, THE PRESIDENT SENT TO THE CONGRESS A PROPOSED NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY ACT OF 1977 (SEE REF AIRGRAM). IN HIS MESSAGE, THE PRESIDENT SAID: "I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS TO ESTABLISH A STRONG, RESPONSIBLE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FROM WHICH WE CAN CONTINUE STRENGTHENED EFFORTS TO HALT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." SINCE THEN, MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE ENGAGED IN FREQUENT AND CLOSE DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PASSED H.R. 8638 BY 411-0 ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1977, AND THE SENATE PASSED S. 897 BY 88-3 ON FEBRUARY 7, 1978. ON FEBRUARY 9, THE HOUSE ACCEPTED THE SENATE VERSION BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT. WE NOW EXPECT THE ENROLLED BILL TO ARRIVE AT THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT FEBRUARY 21, AND THEREAFTER THE PRESIDENT HAS 10 DAYS (SUNDAYS EXCEPTED) TO SIGN IT INTO LAW. UPON SIGNING, THE PROVISIONS BECOME EFFECTIVE AS LAW IMMEDIATELY.

3. SUMMARY OF APPROACH OF THE LEGISLATION. THE BILL DEFINES IMMEDIATE EXPORT CONDITIONS WHICH CAN NOW REASONABLY BE MET FOR COOPERATION UNDER EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND OTHER UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 039449

ARRANGEMENTS PENDING THEIR RENEGOTIATION. THIS WILL INTRODUCE GREATER PREDICTABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN THE U.S. EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS. IT ENJOINS THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, TO TAKE TIMELY ACTION ON NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS. IT SETS TIME LIMITS AND REQUIRES THAT LICENSES BE ISSUED WHEN ALL THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ARE MET. THE BILL ALSO TIGHTENS CONDITIONS OF U. S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION THROUGH TOUGHER REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND BY REQUIRING RENEGOTIATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO MEET THE SAME STANDARDS AS FOR NEW AGREEMENTS. TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, THE BILL REQUIRES, AS A CONDITION OF EXPORT IN THE CASE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS COVER ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE RECIPIENT NATION. THE BILL FURTHER REQUIRES A CUT-OFF OF COOPERATION IF A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE DETONATES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, TERMINATES IAEA SAFEGUARDS, OR MATERIALLY VIOLATES A U. S. COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND IN CERTAIN OTHER SITUATIONS. IT ESTABLISHES POLICIES AND PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH THE U. S. AS A RELIABLE SUPPLIER AND TO PROMOTE ASSURED FUEL SUPPLY TO THOSE NATIONS THAT ACCEPT NEW CONTROLS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY IS DIRECTED TO INSTALL THE REQUISITE ENRICHMENT CAPACITY, AS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY LAW. THE BILL FURTHER ESTABLISHES NEW PROCEDURES, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRESIDENTIAL OVERRIDE OF

NEGATIVE LICENSING DECISIONS BY THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, TO EXPEDITE AND MAKE MORE CERTAIN THE NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS. FINALLY, THE BILL SUPPORTS THE RE-EVALUATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE JOINTLY WITH NUCLEAR SUPPLIER AND RECIPIENT NATIONS (INFCE).

4. KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED IN NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION:
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 039449

(1) SAFEGUARDS OF CONTINUING DURATION ON U. S. SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THEIR USE.

(2) A REQUIREMENT THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS BE MAINTAINED ON ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AS A CONTINUING CONDITION OF U. S. SUPPLY;

(3) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT U.S. SUPPLY AND ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH ITS USE WILL NOT BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR OTHER MILITARY PURPOSE;

(4) A STIPULATION THAT THE U.S. SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUIRE THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT IF THE COOPERATING PARTY DETONATES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR TERMINATES OR ABROGATES AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS;

(5) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT IT WILL OBTAIN WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE U. S. TO RETRANSFER U. S. SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL AND ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED FROM U. S. SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR THROUGH THE USE OF U. S. SUPPLIED REACTORS;

(6) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO ANY NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRANSFERRED PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT AND WITH RESPECT TO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL OR REACTOR TRANSFERRED BY THE U. S.;

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 039449

(7) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT IT WILL NOT REPROCESS, ENRICH OR (FOR WEAPONS GRADE OR IRRADIATED MATERIAL) OTHERWISE ALTER IN FORM OR CONTENT U.S. SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

PRODUCED FROM U. S. SUPPLIED MATERIAL OR THROUGH THE USE
OF U. S. REACTORS WITHOUT U. S. APPROVAL;

(8) A GUARANTEE THAT NO PLUTONIUM, U-233, OR HIGHLY
ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIED BY THE U. S. OR RECOVERED FROM
MATERIAL OR REACTORS SUPPLIED BY THE U. S. WILL BE STORED
IN ANY FACILITY THAT HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE U.S.;

(9) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT ANY
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL, PRODUCTION FACILITY, OR UTILIZA-
TION FACILITY PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF ANY TRANSFERRED
SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY (I.E., REPROCESSING, ENRICH-
MENT OR HEAVY WATER TECHNOLOGY) WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL OF
THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS.

ONE OR MORE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS MAY BE WAIVED BY THE
PRESIDENT (BUT NOT EFFECTIVELY TO PERMIT EXPORTS, IF IT
IS ALSO IMMEDIATELY APPLICABLE EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA)
IF THE PRESIDENT FINDS THEIR INCLUSION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR
OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY. PRIOR TO
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ANY NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENT, THE
AGREEMENT MUST LIE BEFORE CONGRESS FOR 60 DAYS OF CONTINU-
OUS SESSION WITHOUT A CONCURRENT (I.E., TWO HOUSE) RESOLU-
TION OF DISAPPROVAL BEING PASSED. THERE IS A SEPARATE
PROVISION OF THE BILL WHICH ASKS THE PRESIDENT TO ENDEAVOR
TO PROVIDE FOR COOPERATION IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
FROM RADIOACTIVE, CHEMICAL OR THERMAL CONTAMINATION ARISING
FROM PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

5. ENRICHMENT AND SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY:
UNDER THE BILL, NO EXPORT OF URANIUM FOR ENRICHMENT IS
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 039449

PERMITTED WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE U. S. FOR
SUCH ENRICHMENT. WITH RESPECT TO NEW OR AMENDED AGREE-
MENTS THAT ENTER INTO FORCE SUBSEQUENT TO ENACTMENT,
EXPORTS OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR ENRICH-
MENT OR REACTOR FUELING MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED PURSUANT TO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. (CURRENTLY, EXPORTS OF
SOURCE MATERIAL FOR ENRICHMENT MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY
NRC LICENSING WITHOUT HAVING TO BE UNDER AN AGREEMENT FOR
COOPERATION.) IN ADDITION, ANY EXPORT OF SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY (ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING AND HEAVY
WATER EQUIPMENT) PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT REQUIRES SPECI-
FIC AGREEMENT PROVISIONS. ALL THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT
AND FOR NEW AGREEMENTS WOULD THEN APPLY.

6. IMMEDIATELY APPLICABLE EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA:
BEFORE AUTHORIZING AN EXPORT OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL OR OF A REACTOR, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS-
SION MUST FIND, BASED ON A REASONABLE JUDGMENT OF THE

ASSURANCES PROVIDED AND OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THAT THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA OR THEIR EQUIVALENT ARE MET:

(1) IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE III (2) OF THE NPT WILL BE APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH MATERIAL OR FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED AND TO ANY SUCH MATERIAL OR FACILITY PREVIOUSLY EXPORTED AND SUBJECT TO

THE APPLICABLE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, AND TO ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE THEREOF:

(2) NO SUCH MATERIAL, FACILITIES OR SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED OR PREVIOUSLY EXPORTED AND SUBJECT TO THE APPLICABLE AGREEMENT FOR COOP UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 039449

ERATION, AND NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THEIR USE, WILL BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR FOR RESEARCH ON OR DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIV DEVICE;

(3) ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH MATERIAL OR FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED AND TO ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE THEREOF;

(4) NO SUCH MATERIALS, FACILITIES, OR SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED, AND NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF SUCH MATERIALS WILL BE RETRANSFERRED TO THE JURISDICTION OF ANY OTHER NATION OR GROUP OF NATIONS UNLESS THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE U. S. IS OBTAINED FOR SUCH RETRANSFER;

(5) NO SUCH MATERIAL PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED AND NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF SUCH MATERIAL WILL BE REPROCESSED OR OTHERWISE ALTERED IN FORM OR CONTENT UNLESS THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE U.S. IS OBTAINED;

(6) NO SUCH SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY SHALL BE EXPORTED UNLESS THE FOREGOING CONDITIONS SHALL BE APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO ANY NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT, WHICH IS PRODUCED OR CONSTRUCTED THROUGH ITS USE.

COOPERATION UNDER U. S. AGREEMENTS WITH GROUPS OF NATIONS (IAEA, EURATOM) IS EXEMPTED FROM REQUIREMENTS (4) AND (5) FOR 30 DAYS AND THEREAFTER FOR 24 MONTHS (WITH POSSIBLE ONE YEAR EXTENSIONS) IF THEY AGREE TO NEGOTIATE CONCERNING THEIR AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH THE IAEA, BUT HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN AGREED TO WITH EURATOM. THE BILL ESTABLISHES PRO-

CEDURES UNDER WHICH THE NRC MAY ISSUE LICENSES COVERING
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 039449

SEVERAL SHIPMENTS OR MAY DECIDE THAT MAKING ALL THE FINDINGS IN THIS LIST OF REQUIREMENTS IS NOT NEEDED IF THERE HAS BEEN NO MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHER, THE BILL ENABLES THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE EXPORTS AFTER AN NRC NEGATIVE DECISION OR INDECISION IF HE FINDS THAT WITHHOLDING THE PROPOSED EXPORT WOULD BE

SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY. SUCH PRESIDENTIAL ACTION IS SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL BY CONCURRENT RESOLUTION.

7. FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS: THE BILL ESTABLISHES A DELAYED NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING CRITERION. AS A CONDITION OF CONTINUED U. S. EXPORT, IAEA SAFEGUARDS MUST BE MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE RECIPIENT STATE AT THE TIME OF THE EXPORT. THIS CRITERION APPLIES TO ANY EXPORT LICENSING APPLICATION FILED 18 MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT AND TO ANY APPLICATION UNDER WHICH THE FIRST EXPORT WOULD OCCUR AT LEAST 24 MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT. HOWEVER, IF THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THAT THE APPLICATION OF THIS CRITERION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY, HE MAY SO NOTIFY THE NRC, AND THE EXPORT LICENSE MAY BE AUTHORIZED, BUT IF THERE IS SUCH A WAIVER THE FIRST EXPORT LICENSE EACH YEAR MUST LIE BEFORE CONGRESS FOR 60 DAYS OF CONTINUOUS SESSION DURING WHICH CONGRESS MAY DISAPPROVE OF THE EXPORT BY A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. IF THERE IS A RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL, NO EXPORT MAY BE MADE TO THE PARTICULAR COUNTRY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THAT CONGRESS. (IF AN AGREEMENT WHERE THE FULL SCOPE REQUIRE-
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 039449

MENT WAS WAIVED BY THE PRESIDENT ENTERS INTO FORCE, THIS CRITERION DOES NOT APPLY TO EXPORT LICENSING FOR THE FIRST YEAR.)

8. CONDUCT RESULTING IN TERMINATION OF SUPPLY: THE BILL LISTS CONDUCT WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE TERMINATION OF U. S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS. WITH RESPECT TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR -WEAPONS STATE, U. S. SUPPLY SHALL TERMINATE IF IT:

(1) DETONATES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE;

(2) TERMINATES OR ABROGATES IAEA SAFEGUARDS;

(3) MATERIALLY VIOLATES AN IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT;
OR

(4) ENGAGES IN ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND HAVING DIRECT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND HAS FAILED TO TAKE STEPS WHICH, IN THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT, REPRESENT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS TOWARD TERMINATING SUCH ACTIVITIES.

WITH RESPECT TO ANY STATE WITH WHICH THE U. S. COOPERATES THE U. S. SHALL TERMINATE NUCLEAR SUPPLY IF, AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, IT:

(A) MATERIALLY VIOLATES AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION WITH THE U. S., OR WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS NOT SUPPLIED UNDER SUCH AN AGREEMENT, MATERIALLY VIOLATES THE TERMS UNDER WHICH SUCH ITEMS WERE SUPPLIED;

(B) ASSISTS, ENCOURAGES, OR INDUCES ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND HAVING DIRECT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 039449

EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRESIDENT, HAS FAILED TO TAKE STEPS WHICH REPRESENT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS TOWARD TERMINATING SUCH ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGEMENT, OR INDUCEMENT OR,

(C) ENTERS INTO AN AGREEMENT AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF REPROCESSING EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVEREIGN CONTROL OF A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE, EXCEPT IN CONNECTION WITH AN INTERNATIONAL FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION IN WHICH THE U. S. IS A PARTICIPANT OR PURSUANT TO A SUBSEQUENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING TO WHICH THE U. S. SUBSCRIBES IT SHOULD BE NOTED, THAT UNDER THIS SECTION OF THE BILL, THE PRESIDENT IS CHARGED WITH MAKING THE INITIAL FINDING WHICH TRIGGERS THE APPLICATION OF THE CUT-OFF, AND, IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE THE CUT-OFF (EVEN HAVING MADE SUCH A FINDING) IF HE DETERMINES THAT CESSATION OF SUCH EXPORTS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY. SUCH A WAIVER, HOWEVER, CAN BE OVERRIDDEN BY A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS WITHIN A 60 DAY PERIOD.

9. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS: THESE ARE, FOR EXAMPLE, FUEL SUPPLY AND ENRICHMENT CONTRACTS, SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS, REPROCESSING OR RE-

TRANSFER CONSENTS. THEY MUST RECEIVE PROMPT CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. U. S. CONSENT FOR REPROCESSING MAY BE GIVEN ONLY IF THERE WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION. AMONG OTHER FACTORS, FOREMOST CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO WHETHER THE REPROCESSING OR RETRANSFER WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER CONDITIONS THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 039449

WILL INSURE TIMELY WARNING TO THE U. S. OR ANY DIVERSION WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE TIME IN WHICH A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE COULD TRANSFORM THE DIVERTED MATERIAL INTO A NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. AN EXCEPTION FROM THIS STANDARD IS MADE FOR REPROCESSING AT FACILITIES THAT HAVE PROCESSED POWER REACTOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT THEREFOR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, IN WHICH CASE THE U.S. MUST ATTEMPT TO INSURE THE SAME STANDARD APPLIES.

10. COMPONENTS AND OTHER PARTS OF FACILITIES. THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IS DIRECTED TO DEFINE COMPONENTS OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES (E.G., OF REACTORS) AND OTHER ITEMS OR SUBSTANCES OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES. THESE WOULD BE LICENSED BY THE NRC, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO FIND, BASED ON A REASONABLE JUDGMENT OF THE ASSURANCES PROVIDED AND OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA OR THEIR EQUIVALENT ARE MET:

(1) IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE III (2) OF THE NPT WILL BE APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH COMPONENT OR SUBSTANCE;

(2) NO SUCH COMPONENT, SUBSTANCE, OR ITEM WILL BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR FOR RESEARCH ON OR DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE;

(3) NO SUCH COMPONENT, SUBSTANCE, OR ITEM WILL BE RETRANSFERRED TO ANY OTHER NATION OR GROUP OF NATIONS UNLESS THE PRIOR CONSENT OF THE U.S. IS OBTAINED.

11. GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS. UNDER CURRENT LAW, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY HAS AUTHORITY, WITHOUT THE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 12 STATE 039449

NEED FOR AN NRC EXPORT LICENSE, TO MAKE DIRECT FOREIGN DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THE BILL LIMITS THIS AUTHORITY TO SMALL QUANTITIES, BUT

PERMITS THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO LICENSE
DOE EXPORTS IN EXCESS OF SUCH QUANTITIES.

12. FUEL ASSURANCE INITIATIVES. THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY IS DIRECTED TO PROCEED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF EXPANDED URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPACITY AS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY LAW. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE NRC ARE DIRECTED TO ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY (WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME LIMITS) IN APPROVING SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS, EXPORTS, AND EXPORT LICENSES. THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTED TO STUDY THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL U. S. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY FOR FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC NEEDS. THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO MEETING WORLD FUTURE

WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR NEEDS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL AUTHORITY (TO PROVIDE AGREED FUEL SERVICES, AND ESTABLISH REPOSITORIES FOR STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES, ETC.). THE PRESIDENT IS FURTHER DIRECTED TO REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INVITING FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS IN NEW U.S. URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES. THESE FUEL ASSURANCES ARE FOR COUNTRIES THAT ADHERE TO POLICIES DESIGNED TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION. THE PRESIDENT IS TO SEEK TO INSURE THAT THESE BENEFITS ARE AVAILABLE ONLY TO THOSE THAT ACCEPT FULL SCOPE IAEA SAFEGUARDS, FOREGO NEW NATIONAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING FACILITIES. IF ANY SUCH FACILITIES THEY DO HAVE UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND INSPECTION, AND DO NOT MANUFACTURE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 13 STATE 039449

13. NEGOTIATION OF FURTHER EXPORT CONTROLS: THE BILL ESTABLISHES A SERIES OF COMMON, STRINGENT NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS REQUESTED TO NEGOTIATE AMONG ALL NATIONS OR GROUPS OF NATIONS. THE FIRST SET OF THESE PARALLELS THE CONDITIONS THAT THE U.S. WILL SEEK IN ITS NEW AND AMENDED AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION. A SECOND SERIES OF GOALS CALLS FOR PLACING ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING, FUEL FABRICATION, AND STOCKPILING UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND INSPECTION. A THIRD GOAL CALLS FOR ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF EACH NATION AND GROUP OF NATIONS, AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS APPLICABLE TO ANY INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENT OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR IRRADIATED MATERIAL.

14. RENEGOTIATION OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTED TO INITIATE A PROGRAM IMMEDIATELY TO RENEGOTIATE EXISTING AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE UNDERTAKINGS THAT WOULD

BE REQUIRED FOR NEW AGREEMENTS UNDER THE BILL. THE BILL FURTHER SPECIFIES THAT THE U. S. SHALL NOT GIVE UP ANY OF THE RIGHTS IT HAS UNDER EXISTING AGREEMENTS (IF THEY RELATE TO THE IMMEDIATELY APPLICABLE EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA) IN NEGOTIATING NEW AGREEMENTS.

15. STRENGTHENING IAEA SAFEGUARDS: THE BILL PROVIDES THAT THE U. S. SHALL SEEK TO ACT WITH OTHER NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN IAEA SAFEGUARDS PROGRAMS IN A NUMBER OF SPECIFIED WAYS, SUCH AS THROUGH PROVIDING RESOURCES AND COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF DATA.

16. FINALLY, THE BILL URGES THE U. S. TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS IN ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN THE UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 14 STATE 039449

DEVELOPMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY RESOURCES. IN THIS REGARD, THE U.S. IS DIRECTED TO INSTITUTE A PROGRAM TO COOPERATE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO BE THE INITIATION, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, OF A PROGRAM FOR THE EXCHANGE OF U. S. SCIENTISTS, TECHNICIANS, AND ENERGY EXPERTS WITH THOSE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

17. COMMENT. ABOVE, WHILE OVERLY LENGTHY, MERELY SYNOPSISIZES MAIN POINTS OF HIGHLY COMPLEX BILL. WE EXPECT THERE WILL BE A LARGE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN THE FUTURE REGARDING BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF BILL. AS MATTERS ARE WORKED OUT AND CLARIFIED, WE WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION TO CONCERNED POSTS. WE WILL ALSO DO BEST WE CAN TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO QUESTIONS FROM POSTS CONCERNING THIS LEGISLATION.

18. WE ARE PREPARING AND EXPECT TO TRANSMIT BY CABLE WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS A MUCH LESS TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE BILL (WHICH POSTS WILL BE ABLE TO USE AS HAND-OUT AS REQUIRED).

VANCE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 039449
ORIGIN L-03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 OES-07 DOE-11 SOE-02 NRC-07 ACDA-12
SIG-02 MMO-04 AID-05 CEA-01 CIAE-00 COME-00
DODE-00 EB-08 H-02 INR-10 INT-05 NSAE-00 NSC-05
OMB-01 PM-05 USIA-15 SP-02 SS-15 STR-07 TRSE-00
PA-02 IO-14 CEQ-01 AF-10 ARA-14 EA-12 EUR-12

NEA-10 /205 R

DRAFTED BY: L/N: RJBETTAUER: AVW
APPROVED BY: OES/NET: LVNOSENZO
DOE-BENGELSDORF, BRUSH
NRC-STOIBER
ACDA-MARSHALL

-----067766 171347Z /53

P 142353Z FEB 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 039449

BRUSSELS FOR USEEC VIENNA FOR IAEA

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 8 (4) FIRST LINE OF () (B) (C)
OMITTED, ALSO FOR OMITTED LETTERS AT END OF LINES THROUGHOUT.)

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ENRG

SUBJECT: NON-PROLIFERATION LEGISLATION

REFS: (A) STATE A-2202 (5/17/77), (B) STATE 35229
(2/10/78)

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF U. S. NONPROLIFER-
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 039449

ATION LEGISLATION PROMISED REFTEL (B). AFTER SIGNING OF
LEGISLATION, WE WILL CABLE TEXT OF SIGNING STATEMENT AND
AIRGRAM TEXT OF NEW LAW. WE WILL ALSO PREPARE MESSAGES IN
FUTURE DETAILING DEPARTMENT'S PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
MEASURES REQUIRED BY NEW LAW.

2. BACKGROUND: FOR SEVERAL YEARS, CONGRESS HAS BEEN WORK-
ING ON COMPREHENSIVE NONPROLIFERATION LEGISLATION. AT THE
END OF THE 94TH SESSION OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATION HAD BEEN
CLOSE TO ENACTMENT. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 95TH SESSION,
WORK BEGAN AGAIN IN BOTH HOUSES. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES AND
ON APRIL 27, 1977, THE PRESIDENT SENT TO THE CONGRESS A
PROPOSED NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY ACT OF 1977
(SEE REF AIRGRAM). IN HIS MESSAGE, THE PRESIDENT SAID:
"I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS TO ESTABLISH A
STRONG, RESPONSIBLE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FROM WHICH WE
CAN CONTINUE STRENGTHENED EFFORTS TO HALT THE SPREAD OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS." SINCE THEN, MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION HAVE ENGAGED IN FREQUENT AND CLOSE DISCUSSIONS

WITH BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PASSED H.R. 8638 BY 411-0 ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1977, AND THE SENATE PASSED S. 897 BY 88-3 ON FEBRUARY 7, 1978. ON FEBRUARY 9, THE HOUSE ACCEPTED THE SENATE VERSION BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT. WE NOW EXPECT THE ENROLLED BILL TO ARRIVE AT THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT FEBRUARY 21, AND THEREAFTER THE PRESIDENT HAS 10 DAYS (SUNDAYS EXCEPTED) TO SIGN IT INTO LAW. UPON SIGNING, THE PROVISIONS BECOME EFFECTIVE AS LAW IMMEDIATELY.

3. SUMMARY OF APPROACH OF THE LEGISLATION. THE BILL DEFINES IMMEDIATE EXPORT CONDITIONS WHICH CAN NOW REASONABLY UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 039449

BE MET FOR COOPERATION UNDER EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS PENDING THEIR RENEGOTIATION. THIS WILL INTRODUCE GREATER PREDICTABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN THE U.S. EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS. IT ENJOINS THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, TO TAKE TIMELY ACTION ON NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATIONS. IT SETS TIME LIMITS AND REQUIRES THAT LICENSES BE ISSUED WHEN ALL THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ARE MET. THE BILL ALSO TIGHTENS CONDITIONS OF U. S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION THROUGH TOUGHER REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND BY REQUIRING RENEGOTIATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS TO MEET THE SAME STANDARDS AS FOR NEW AGREEMENTS. TWENTY-FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, THE BILL REQUIRES, AS A CONDITION OF EXPORT IN THE CASE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS COVER ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE RECIPIENT NATION. THE BILL FURTHER REQUIRES A CUT-OFF OF COOPERATION IF A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE DETONATES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, TERMINATES IAEA SAFEGUARDS, OR MATERIALLY VIOLATES A U. S. COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND IN CERTAIN OTHER SITUATIONS. IT ESTABLISHES POLICIES AND PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH THE U. S. AS A RELIABLE SUPPLIER AND TO PROMOTE ASSURED FUEL SUPPLY TO THOSE NATIONS THAT ACCEPT NEW CONTROLS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY IS DIRECTED TO INSTALL THE REQUISITE ENRICHMENT CAPACITY, AS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY LAW. THE BILL FURTHER ESTABLISHES NEW PROCEDURES, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRESIDENTIAL OVERRIDE OF NEGATIVE LICENSING DECISIONS BY THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, TO EXPEDITE AND MAKE MORE CERTAIN THE NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS. FINALLY, THE BILL SUPPORTS THE RE-EVALUATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE JOINTLY WITH NUCLEAR SUPPLIER AND RECIPIENT NATIONS (INFCE).

4. KEY ELEMENTS REQUIRED IN NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENTS UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 039449

FOR COOPERATION:

(1) SAFEGUARDS OF CONTINUING DURATION ON U. S. SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THEIR USE.

(2) A REQUIREMENT THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS BE MAINTAINED ON ALL PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AS A CONTINUING CONDITION OF U. S. SUPPLY;

(3) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT U.S. SUPPLY AND ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH ITS USE WILL NOT BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR OTHER MILITARY PURPOSE;

(4) A STIPULATION THAT THE U.S. SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUIRE THE RETURN OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT IF THE COOPERATING PARTY DETONATES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR TERMINATES OR ABROGATES AN AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS;

(5) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT IT WILL OBTAIN WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE U. S. TO RETRANSFER U. S. SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL AND ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED FROM U. S. SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR THROUGH THE USE OF U. S. SUPPLIED REACTORS;

(6) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO ANY NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRANSFERRED PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT AND WITH RESPECT TO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL OR REACTOR TRANSFERRED BY THE U. S.;

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 039449

(7) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT IT WILL NOT REPROCESS, ENRICH OR (FOR WEAPONS GRADE OR IRRADIATED MATERIAL) OTHERWISE ALTER IN FORM OR CONTENT U.S. SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED FROM U. S. SUPPLIED MATERIAL OR THROUGH THE USE OF U. S. REACTORS WITHOUT U. S. APPROVAL;

(8) A GUARANTEE THAT NO PLUTONIUM, U-233, OR HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIED BY THE U. S. OR RECOVERED FROM MATERIAL OR REACTORS SUPPLIED BY THE U. S. WILL BE STORED IN ANY FACILITY THAT HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE U.S.;

(9) A GUARANTEE BY THE COOPERATING PARTY THAT ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL, PRODUCTION FACILITY, OR UTILIZA-

TION FACILITY PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF ANY TRANSFERRED SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY (I.E., REPROCESSING, ENRICHMENT OR HEAVY WATER TECHNOLOGY) WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL OF THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS.

ONE OR MORE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS MAY BE WAIVED BY THE PRESIDENT (BUT NOT EFFECTIVELY TO PERMIT EXPORTS, IF IT IS ALSO IMMEDIATELY APPLICABLE EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA) IF THE PRESIDENT FINDS THEIR INCLUSION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY. PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ANY NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENT, THE AGREEMENT MUST LIE BEFORE CONGRESS FOR 60 DAYS OF CONTINUOUS SESSION WITHOUT A CONCURRENT (I.E., TWO HOUSE) RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL BEING PASSED. THERE IS A SEPARATE PROVISION OF THE BILL WHICH ASKS THE PRESIDENT TO ENDEAVOR TO PROVIDE FOR COOPERATION IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM RADIOACTIVE, CHEMICAL OR THERMAL CONTAMINATION ARISING FROM PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.

5. ENRICHMENT AND SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY:

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 039449

UNDER THE BILL, NO EXPORT OF URANIUM FOR ENRICHMENT IS PERMITTED WITHOUT THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE U. S. FOR SUCH ENRICHMENT. WITH RESPECT TO NEW OR AMENDED AGREEMENTS THAT ENTER INTO FORCE SUBSEQUENT TO ENACTMENT, EXPORTS OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR ENRICHMENT OR REACTOR FUELING MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. (CURRENTLY, EXPORTS OF SOURCE MATERIAL FOR ENRICHMENT MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY NRC LICENSING WITHOUT HAVING TO BE UNDER AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION.) IN ADDITION, ANY EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY (ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING AND HEAVY WATER EQUIPMENT) PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT REQUIRES SPECIFIC AGREEMENT PROVISIONS. ALL THE CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT AND FOR NEW AGREEMENTS WOULD THEN APPLY.

6. IMMEDIATELY APPLICABLE EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA:

BEFORE AUTHORIZING AN EXPORT OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR OF A REACTOR, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION MUST FIND, BASED ON A REASONABLE JUDGMENT OF THE ASSURANCES PROVIDED AND OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THAT THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA OR THEIR EQUIVALENT ARE MET:

(1) IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE III (2) OF THE NPT WILL BE APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH MATERIAL OR FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED AND TO ANY SUCH MATERIAL OR FACILITY PREVIOUSLY EXPORTED AND SUBJECT TO

THE APPLICABLE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, AND TO ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED THROUGH THE

USE THEREOF:

(2) NO SUCH MATERIAL, FACILITIES OR SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED OR PREVIOUSLY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 039449

EXPORTED AND SUBJECT TO THE APPLICABLE AGREEMENT FOR COOP
ERATION, AND NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH
THEIR USE, WILL BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
OR FOR RESEARCH ON OR DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
DEVICE;

(3)# ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES WILL BE
MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH MATERIAL OR FACILITIES
PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED AND TO ANY SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE THEREOF;

(4) NO SUCH MATERIALS, FACILITIES, OR SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED, AND NO SPECIAL
NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF SUCH MATERIAL
WILL BE RETRANSFERRED TO THE JURISDICTION OF ANY OTHER
NATION OR GROUP OF NATIONS UNLESS THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF
THE U. S. IS OBTAINED FOR SUCH RETRANSFER;

(5) NO SUCH MATERIAL PROPOSED TO BE EXPORTED AND NO
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH THE USE OF SUCH
MATERIAL WILL BE REPROCESSED OR OTHERWISE ALTERED IN FORM
OR CONTENT UNLESS THE PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE U.S. IS
OBTAINED;

(6) NO SUCH SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY SHALL BE
EXPORTED UNLESS THE FOREGOING CONDITIONS SHALL BE APPLIED
WITH RESPECT TO ANY NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT, WHICH
IS PRODUCED OR CONSTRUCTED THROUGH ITS USE.

COOPERATION UNDER U. S. AGREEMENTS WITH GROUPS OF NATIONS
(IAEA, EURATOM) IS EXEMPTED FROM REQUIREMENTS (4) AND (5)
FOR 30 DAYS AND THEREAFTER FOR 24 MONTHS (WITH POSSIBLE
ONE YEAR EXTENSIONS) IF THEY AGREE TO NEGOTIATE CONCERN-
ING THEIR AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS
HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH THE IAEA, BUT HAVE NOT AS YET
BEEN AGREED TO WITH EURATOM. THE BILL ESTABLISHES PRO-
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 039449

CEDURES UNDER WHICH THE NRC MAY ISSUE LICENSES COVERING
SEVERAL SHIPMENTS OR MAY DECIDE THAT MAKING ALL THE
FINDINGS IN THIS LIST OF REQUIREMENTS IS NOT NEEDED IF
THERE HAS BEEN NO MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
FURTHER, THE BILL ENABLES THE PRESIDENT TO AUTHORIZE
EXPORTS AFTER AN NRC NEGATIVE DECISION OR INDECISION IF

HE FINDS THAT WITHHOLDING THE PROPOSED EXPORT WOULD BE

SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY. SUCH PRESIDENTIAL ACTION IS SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL BY CONCURRENT RESOLUTION.

7. FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS: THE BILL ESTABLISHES A DELAYED NUCLEAR EXPORT LICENSING CRITERION. AS A CONDITION OF CONTINUED U. S. EXPORT, IAEA SAFEGUARDS MUST BE MAINTAINED WITH RESPECT TO ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN THE RECIPIENT STATE AT THE TIME OF THE EXPORT. THIS CRITERION APPLIES TO ANY EXPORT LICENSING APPLICATION FILED 18 MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT AND TO ANY APPLICATION UNDER WHICH THE FIRST EXPORT WOULD OCCUR AT LEAST 24 MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT. HOWEVER, IF THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THAT THE APPLICATION OF THIS CRITERION WOULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY, HE MAY SO NOTIFY THE NRC, AND THE EXPORT LICENSE MAY BE AUTHORIZED, BUT IF THERE IS SUCH A WAIVER THE FIRST EXPORT LICENSE EACH YEAR MUST LIE BEFORE CONGRESS FOR 60 DAYS OF CONTINUOUS SESSION DURING WHICH CONGRESS MAY DISAPPROVE OF THE EXPORT BY A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. IF THERE IS A RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL, NO EXPORT MAY BE MADE TO THE PARTICULAR COUNTRY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 039449

CONGRESS. (IF AN AGREEMENT WHERE THE FULL SCOPE REQUIREMENT WAS WAIVED BY THE PRESIDENT ENTERS INTO FORCE, THIS CRITERION DOES NOT APPLY TO EXPORT LICENSING FOR THE FIRST YEAR.)

8. CONDUCT RESULTING IN TERMINATION OF SUPPLY: THE BILL LISTS CONDUCT WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE TERMINATION OF U. S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS. WITH RESPECT TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR -WEAPONS STATE, U. S. SUPPLY SHALL TERMINATE IF IT:

(1) DETONATES A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE;

(2) TERMINATES OR ABROGATES IAEA SAFEGUARDS;

(3) MATERIALLY VIOLATES AN IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT;
OR

(4) ENGAGES IN ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND HAVING DIRECT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND HAS FAILED TO TAKE STEPS WHICH, IN THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT, REPRESENT SUFFICIENT PROGRESS TOWARD TERMINATING SUCH ACTIVITIES.

WITH RESPECT TO ANY STATE WITH WHICH THE U. S. COOPERATES
THE U. S. SHALL TERMINATE NUCLEAR SUPPLY IF, AFTER THE
DATE OF ENACTMENT, IT:

(A) MATERIALLY VIOLATES AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION
WITH THE U. S., OR WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS NOT SUPPLIED
UNDER SUCH AN AGREEMENT, MATERIALLY VIOLATES THE TERMS
UNDER WHICH SUCH ITEMS WERE SUPPLIED;

(B) ASSISTS, ENCOURAGES, OR INDUCES ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
STATE TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES INVOLVING
SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND HAVING DIRECT
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 039449

SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR ACQUISITION OF NUCLEA
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, AND IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRESIDENT,
HAS FAILED TO TAKE STEPS WHICH REPRESENT SUFFICIENT PRO-
GRESS TOWARD TERMINATING SUCH ASSISTANCE, ENCOURAGEMENT,
OR INDUCEMENT OR,

(C) ENTERS INTO AN AGREEMENT AFTER THE DATE OF
ENACTMENT FOR THE TRANSFER OF REPROCESSING EQUIPMENT,
MATERIAL, OR TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVEREIGN CONTROL OF A NO
-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE, EXCEPT IN CONNECTION WITH AN INTER
NATIONAL FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION IN WHICH THE U. S. IS A
PARTICIPANT OR PURSUANT TO A SUBSEQUENT INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING TO WHICH THE U. S. SUBSCRIBES
IT SHOULD BE NOTED, THAT UNDER THIS SECTION OF THE BILL,
THE PRESIDENT IS CHARGED WITH MAKING THE INITIAL FINDING
WHICH TRIGGERS THE APPLICATION OF THE CUT-OFF, AND, IN
ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT MAY WAIVE THE CUT-OFF (EVEN HAVING
MADE SUCH A FINDING) IF HE DETERMINES THAT CESSATION OF
SUCH EXPORTS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF U. S. NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES OR
OTHERWISE JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY.
SUCH A WAIVER, HOWEVER, CAN BE OVERRIDDEN BY A CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS WITHIN A 60 DAY PERIOD.

9. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS: THESE ARE, FOR EXAMPLE,
FUEL SUPPLY AND ENRICHMENT CONTRACTS, SAFEGUARDS AND
PHYSICAL PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS, REPROCESSING OR RE-
TRANSFER CONSENTS. THEY MUST RECEIVE PROMPT CONSIDERATION
BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH THEIR
IMPLEMENTATION. U. S. CONSENT FOR REPROCESSING MAY BE
GIVEN ONLY IF THERE WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN
THE RISK OF PROLIFERATION. AMONG OTHER FACTORS, FORE-
MOST CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO WHETHER THE REPROCESS
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 039449

ING OR RETRANSFER WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER CONDITIONS THAT WILL INSURE TIMELY WARNING TO THE U. S. OR ANY DIVERSION WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE TIME IN WHICH A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE COULD TRANSFORM THE DIVERTED MATERIAL INTO A NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. AN EXCEPTION FROM THIS STANDARD IS MADE FOR REPROCESSING AT FACILITIES THAT HAVE PROCESSED POWER REACTOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT THEREFOR PRIOR TO THE DATE OF ENACTMENT, IN WHICH CASE THE U.S. MUST ATTEMPT TO INSURE THE SAME STANDARD APPLIES.

10. COMPONENTS AND OTHER PARTS OF FACILITIES. THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IS DIRECTED TO DEFINE COMPONENTS OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES (E.G., OF REACTORS) AND OTHER ITEMS OR SUBSTANCES OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PURPOSES. THESE WOULD BE LICENSED BY THE NRC, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO FIND, BASED ON A REASONABLE JUDGMENT OF THE ASSURANCES PROVIDED AND OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THAT THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA OR THEIR EQUIVALENT ARE MET:

(1) IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE III (2) OF THE NPT WILL BE APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SUCH COMPONENT OR SUBSTANCE;

(2) NO SUCH COMPONENT, SUBSTANCE, OR ITEM WILL BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OR FOR RESEARCH ON OR DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE;

(3) NO SUCH COMPONENT, SUBSTANCE, OR ITEM WILL BE RETRANSFERRED TO ANY OTHER NATION OR GROUP OF NATIONS UNLESS THE PRIOR CONSENT OF THE U.S. IS OBTAINED.

11. GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS. UNDER CURRENT UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 12 STATE 039449

LAW, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY HAS AUTHORITY, WITHOUT THE NEED FOR AN NRC EXPORT LICENSE, TO MAKE DIRECT FOREIGN DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOURCE AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THE BILL LIMITS THIS AUTHORITY TO SMALL QUANTITIES, BUT PERMITS THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TO LICENSE DOE EXPORTS IN EXCESS OF SUCH QUANTITIES.

12. FUEL ASSURANCE INITIATIVES. THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY IS DIRECTED TO PROCEED WITH THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF EXPANDED URANIUM ENRICHMENT CAPACITY AS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY LAW. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE NRC ARE DIRECTED TO ACT EXPEDITIOUSLY (WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME LIMITS) IN APPROVING SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS, EXPORTS, AND EXPORT LICENSES. THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTED TO STUDY

THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL U. S. ENRICHMENT CAPACITY FOR FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC NEEDS. THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO MEETING WORLD FUTURE

WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR NEEDS, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE NEGOTIATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL AUTHORITY (TO PROVIDE AGREED FUEL SERVICES, AND ESTABLISH REPOSITORIES FOR STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES, ETC.). THE PRESIDENT IS FURTHER DIRECTED TO REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF INVITING FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS IN NEW U.S. URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES. THESE FUEL ASSURANCES ARE FOR COUNTRIES THAT ADHERE TO POLICIES DESIGNED TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION. THE PRESIDENT IS TO SEEK TO INSURE THAT THESE BENEFITS ARE AVAILABLE ONLY TO THOSE THAT ACCEPT FULL SCOPE IAEA SAFEGUARDS, FOREGO NEW NATIONAL ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING FACILITIES. IF ANY SUCH FACILITIES THEY DO HAVE UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND INSPECTION, AND DO NOT MANUFACTURE OR OTHER-UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 13 STATE 039449

WISE ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

13. NEGOTIATION OF FURTHER EXPORT CONTROLS: THE BILL ESTABLISHES A SERIES OF COMMON, STRINGENT NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICIES WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS REQUESTED TO NEGOTIATE AMONG ALL NATIONS OR GROUPS OF NATIONS. THE FIRST SET OF THESE PARALLELS THE CONDITIONS THAT THE U.S. WILL SEEK IN ITS NEW AND AMENDED AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION. A SECOND SERIES OF GOALS CALLS FOR PLACING ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING FUEL FABRICATION, AND STOCKPILING UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES AND INSPECTION. A THIRD GOAL CALLS FOR ADEQUATE PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF EACH NATION AND GROUP OF NATIONS, AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS APPLICABLE TO ANY INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENT OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR IRRADIATED MATERIAL.

14. RENEGOTIATION OF COOPERATION AGREEMENTS: THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTED TO INITIATE A PROGRAM IMMEDIATELY TO RENEGOTIATE EXISTING AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE UNDERTAKINGS THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR NEW AGREEMENTS UNDER THE BILL. THE BILL FURTHER SPECIFIES THAT THE U. S. SHALL NOT GIVE UP ANY OF THE RIGHTS IT HAS UNDER EXISTING AGREEMENTS (IF THEY RELATE TO THE IMMEDIATELY APPLICABLE EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA) IN NEGOTIATING NEW AGREEMENTS.

15. STRENGTHENING IAEA SAFEGUARDS: THE BILL PROVIDES THAT THE U. S. SHALL SEEK TO ACT WITH OTHER NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN IAEA SAFEGUARDS PROGRAMS IN A NUMBER OF SPECI-

FIED WAYS, SUCH AS THROUGH PROVIDING RESOURCES AND COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF DATA.

16. FINALLY, THE BILL URGES THE U. S. TO COOPERATE WITH OTHER NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AND PRIVATE UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 14 STATE 039449

ORGANIZATIONS IN ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY RESOURCES. IN THIS REGARD, THE U.S. IS DIRECTED TO INSTITUTE A PROGRAM TO COOPERATE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS PROGRAM IS TO BE THE INITIATION, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, OF A PROGRAM FOR THE EXCHANGE OF U. S. SCIENTISTS, TECHNICIANS, AND ENERGY EXPERTS WITH THOSE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

17. COMMENT. ABOVE, WHILE OVERLY LENGTHY, MERELY SYNOPSISIZES MAIN POINTS OF HIGHLY COMPLEX BILL. WE EXPECT THERE WILL BE A LARGE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN THE FUTURE REGARDING BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF BILL. AS MATTERS ARE WORKED OUT AND CLARIFIED, WE WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION TO CONCERNED POSTS. WE WILL ALSO DO BEST WE CAN TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO QUESTIONS FROM POSTS CONCERNING THIS LEGISLATION.

18. WE ARE PREPARING AND EXPECT TO TRANSMIT BY CABLE WITHIN SEVERAL DAYS A MUCH LESS TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE BILL (WHICH POSTS WILL BE ABLE TO USE AS HAND-OUT AS REQUIRED).
VANCE

NOTE BY OCT: REGIONAL BUREAUS TAKE MSG AS ORIGINAL.

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, LEGISLATIVE BILLS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 jan 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE039449
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: L/N: RJBETTAUER: AVW
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780072-0138, D780068-0917
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197802120/baaafbvr.tel
Line Count: 1064
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 8a9db5cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN L
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 20
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) STATE A-2202 (5/17/77), (B) STATE 35229 (2/10/78)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 mar 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3475563
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NON-PROLIFERATION LEGISLATION
TAGS: ENRG, TECH, PARM, MNUC, US
To: ALDIP
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/8a9db5cf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014